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THE PUBLIC GRANARY INSTITUTION OF THE CH'ING DYNASTY, 1644-1911

The existence of dyanstic cycles durin~ the long history of
imperial China (221 B.C. -

A.D. 1911) implies that for each

dynasty a long prosperous period is to be followed by a declining
period.

During the prosperous period, various public institutions,

such as civil service, education, and military, are gradually
established as guided by certain ideology, only to witness their
decline during the declining period.

For the Ch'ing dynasty, in

particular, there is a nearly unanimous agreement among historians

that the turning point occurred around the year 1800, marking off
the early prosperous phase (sheng-Ch'ing, 1683-1795) from the
declining phase (lia!!,-~h'ing, 1796-1911).
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In this paper, we want

to study the construction and decline of public granary institu
tion in the background of such a historical periodization of the
Ch '.ina dynasty.
The importance of the public granary institution is due
primarily to the fact that in a premodern agrarian society, the
most important cause of social insecurity is crop fluctuation.
There are plenty of historical documentation of the frequency as
well as severity of natural calamities (flood, drought, locust,
etc.) throughout the history for which China has written records.
Indeed, the idea that public granary institution should be used
to defend against crop fluctuations can be tracad to the Han
dynasty when the public granary (ch'ang-p'ing-ts'ang or ever
normal gr~na~y) was institutionalized in 5~ B.C.

Thereafter, it

became a permanent Chinese institution of all later dynasties as
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a varie ty of new public grana ry system were estab lished 3
.
With ali the exper iment s and exper ience s in previo us
dynas ties, the found er of the Ch'ing dynas ty readi ly
recog nized
the impor tance of public grana ry system as a basic instit
ution al
desig n.

An imper ial order was decree d as early as in 1657 to
the

effec t that "All provi ncial gover nors should repai r or
const ruct
publi c grana ry."

Later on, regul ation s speci fied detai ls as to

the amoun t of grain to be in stock and the rules accord
ing to
which the grain should be "rotat ed" (usua lly over a three
-year
cycle ) to compe nsate for seaso nal and crop failur e induce
d
fluctu ation s.

The imper ial order s were earne stly imple mente d,

develo ped, and streng thene d during the prosp erous phase
.

Howev er,

the instit ution began to declin e from aroun d 1815 coinc
iding with
the begin ning of dynas tic declin e. 4
In analy zing tbe public grana ry system of the Ch'ing
dynas ty,
we sho~ld empha size not only its instit ution aliza tion
and declin e
but also its opera tiona l conse quenc es.

The publi c grana ry system

is used to defen d again st two types of fluctu ation s,
i.e.,
·sea_so nal and cycli cal or crop failur e induc ed, which
are conce ptuall y
quite distin ct.

We shall first analy ze princ iples gover ning these

opera tional aspec ts from a theor etical stand point (Secti
ons I to
III).

The theor etica l impli cation will be statis tical ly implem
ented

with data colle cted from the local gazet teers of Szechw
an provin ce
which will be brief ly discu ssed in Sectio n IV and Appen
dix I.

The

idea is that the effec tiven ess of publi c grana ry system
must be
gauge d mainl y in terms of the sever ity of price fluctu
ation s which
the govern ment seeks to preve nt.

This is, in turn, determ ined
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by the quantity of food grain being stocked up in the warehous e.
The construc tion and decline of public granary instituti on is
reflected ,

in our study, by the time trends of quantity of

stockpile d food grain as well as the grain price fluctuati ons.
The analysis of this issue will be presente d in the last section.
The historic al significa nce of our finding will be briefly
summariz ed in conclusi on.
Section I. Principl es of Operatio n of Public Granary
The root cause of all major social security issues (or
rather social insecuri ty) is traced to the divergen ce (i.e., non
coinciden ce) of productio n and consumpt ion at each time point. 5
In a premodern agrarian society, the productio n and consumpt ion
can diverse either due to seasonal or to cyclical fluctuati ons.
In general, the public granary system is used to improve the time

.

utilitf of food grain (hereafte r refers to as rice) so that the
surplus food produced at times of abundanc e can be consumed at
times of shortage .

There are, however, major differen ces between

the two types of fluctuati ons, which require differen t emphasis
·on the public granary suppleme ntary to the private granary system.
In principl e, to defend against the seasonal fluctuat ions, the
primary roles are played by the private granarie s (e.g., that of
the grain merchant s and consumin g househol ds includin g the farmers
themselv es) and that public granary system operates only to
compensa te for the deficienc y of the private system.

In cyclical

fluctuati ons, the opposite is true.
In this section, we shall first discuss the principl es of

seasonal operation.

Those governing cyclical operation will be

discussed in ·section I I .

The construction and decline of the

public granary institution, which is a conceptually quite distinct
long-term issue, will be discussed in Section III.
Natural Seasonal Price Fluctuation
In the upper deck of Figure 1, the 24 months of two consecutive
years are indicated on the horizontal axis.

Let us assume the

annual total output of rice and consumption demand is 12 units
as indicated by the height of the horizontal line aa'.

The total

output (ca= 12) appearing on the market during the month of
August is assumed to be consumed during the next 12 months at a
rate of d = 1 unit per month.

Thus the straight line ab indicates

the quantity of rice in 1:it.orage (QRIS) which declines linearly

to next August.

(The vertical gap between ab and the horizontal

line¥' is the cumulative value of consumption during the cycle.)
Assuming constant rice output with no cyclical fluctuations,
QRIS is indicated in Figure 2a by the curve a b a b ••• with
1 1 2 2
constant periodicity (i.e., a 12-month cycle) as well as a
constant amplitude of fluctuations (i.e., from Oto 12 unitsi.
Because of the divergence between the time of production
(i.e., August) and consumption (i.e., evenly distributed through
12 months), the storage, interest, and transportation cost must

be incurred to increase the time utility of rice.

Thus the

rational and natural monthly rice price increases from the first
August to the next as indicated approximately by the straight
· the lower deck of
line pq in ~Figure 1 (or p q p q pJqJ in Figure 2b) showing an
1 1 2 2
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amplitude o:f :fluctuation between a bottom price p• and a ceiling

•

price p , with a gap (p • -p.) which re:flects the various cost
elements.

Such a natural :fluctuation o:f rice price is absolutely

essential to call :forth the services rendered by the merchants.

In reality, the seasonal movement o:f prices is indicated in
Figure 1 by the inverse u-shaped curve pmp' that reaches a
maximum in March and declines steadily from March to the next

August.

(In Figure 2b, this is shown by the wave like curve

p m q p m q ••• with the same amplitude o:f fluctuation between p •
1 1 1 2 2 2

and p • ).

That seasonal price movement has a wave like pattern

(pmp') rather than linear (pq) is due basically to speculation.
In March when the rice merchants anticipate price decline in
August (when new crop appears) will actually sell the rice more
eagerly so that price will :fall gradually a:fter March.
Using the cont~mporary experience in Taiwan as an illustra
tion; °'the average seasonal fluctuation of rice price during 1969-

1974 is indicated by a solid curve in Figure 3.
18.3% variation between p

•

and p ••

There is an

6

Exaggerated Seasonal Price Fluctuation in a Speculative Market

Speculation, however, is a very tricky "psychological thing",
witnessing the perpetual fluctuation of prices, traced to buyers'

•na sellers' speculation about the future, even in the highly
organized stock market in a modern society.

A slightly favorable

or unfavorable expectation of the new crop may cause the merchants
to withhold buying or selling, thus gives the seasonal price
movement a more exaggerated amplitude of fluctuation as indicated

6
by the dotted curve uvu' in Figure 1.

Thus in August, the rice

price can be much lower than natural (gap pu) or in March much
higher (gap vm).

That the seasonal price can move in an exaggerated fashion
due to speculation has been well recognized in Chinese history.
In fact, the most famous rural reform introduced in 1069 by Wang
An-shih during the Northern Sung period (960-1127) dealt
specifically with this issue under the so called ch'ing-miao-fa
(green sprout system) to address to what was regarded as a
serious social injustice to the farmers. 7

This issue is basically

what is now regarded as a problem of short-term rural finance
which is traced, on th~ one hand, to the seasonal pattern of

agricultural production and to the storage management system on
the other.
The'managerial System of Grain Stockpiling
~

The management of storage system, from the social point of
view, is divided into public warehouse (ax) on the one hand and

private storage (xc) on the other (see Figure 1).

The latter is

subdivided into storage by grain merchants (xy) and farmers for
their own consumption (ye).
xy + ye.

For example, in August, QRIS •ax+

Thus, the system is a mixed one involving public and

private operations.

Let us first describe the farmers' managerial

system in respect to ye to concentrate on the equity issue

mentioned above.
Because of their own consumption, the farmers exhaust their

grain by March (as indicated by line yy') whereby they must borrow

7
money (which amounts to borrow rice in March) to be paid back by
the new crop in August.

With the rational seasonal fluctuation

pattern (mp'), the farmers pay no more than the real rate of
interest plus the storage cost.
Let us assume that the seasonal fluctuation of price is
completely nature.

It is obvious that the burden on the farmers

has two natural components.
market interest rate (e.g., i

On the one hand, they must pay a
=

J%

per month).

On the other hand,

they must pay the storage and interest charge because the grain
which they consume are already stored for six months between

August and March.

It can be shown, however, that the real interest

rate in terms of rice (r), even when the seasonal fluctuation of
at least
price is com~letely normal, should beAtwice the market rate of
interest (i).

(See Appendix II, r = 2i + j.)

In other word~ if market rate of interest is
farme~s.have to pay a

6%

J%,

the

interest rate per month in terms of rice.

This is completely equitable and natural.

However, the farmers

are easily penalized by an exaggerated cyclical price movement
causing a wider price gap between p

•

and p ••

For it is obvious

that with more violent fluctuations o! rice prices, the !armers'
burden, measured in terms of the real rice interest rate would·
be much higher than twice the rate of interest mentioned earlier.
In Chinese history, this inequity to the farmers due to the
exaggerated fluctuation of rice price was usually vaguely

recognized as an issue involving usury and seasonal price
fluctuation.

Thus, during the Sung dynasty, the reform of Wang

An•shih tried to incorporate a low interest rate loan policy to

8
help the farmers under the name of ch'ing-miao-ch'ien (green
sprout money).

This regulation was attacked at the time mainly

on the ground that the farmers were not able to pay back their

loan.

Underlying this argument is the fact that the real interest

burden in terms of rice was too heavy.

8

Purpose of Government Seasonal Operation
There are two purposes of government seasonal operation, a
technical one and an equitable one.

Both purposes are served

simulteneously by the government managerial practices.

Operation

wise, the government withholds the grain purchased in August (ax)
for six months and gadually begin selling activity in March.

(Thus, the portion of QRIS held by the government is indicated
by the vertical shaded distance where the line xx' paralles to
yy' and az in Figure 1.)

The government will have to acquire

the_a.tn9unt of ax again each August as the government granary
becomes exhausted (see Figure 2c for the seasonal pattern,
g1f1d1g2f2~2•••)•
This is the so called rotating system mentioned earlier.
For example, in 1689 an imperial order reads:

11 1n

province, a third of the grain in storage is to be

Szechwan
loaned to

soldiers and citizens and to be paid back annually and cyclically.
This is to be a permanent institution. 119

Apparently, the

government decree meant that a stock-piling rice which is three
times ax, or in Figure 2c the additional government storage is

indicated ~y the distance of cs~ 2ax.

(In other words, the

minimum. amount of government grain which, reaches in the month of

9

July, is cs= 2ax.)

Presumably, the extra grain (cs) not used

for seasonal operation is a reserve for anti-cyclical fluctuations.

The rotation system is adopted primarily to prevent the
deterioration of the quality of grain in storage. Under the
three-year rotation system, no food grain should stay in the warehouse longer than three years.

10

Thus we see the seasonal

operation is a technical matter complementary to the anti-cyclical

fluctuation (i.e., to preserve the quality of rice for anticyclical operation).

From the viewpoint of anti-seasonal operation,

it is only a secondary consideration.
The basic and major purpose of anti-seasonal operation of
public granary system is to bring the exaggerated price fluctuation
back to the natural level.

Again, using the contemporary experience

as an illust1·ation, the 1:1easunal price !luct.uat.iun in Taiwau ai:;
shown by the dotted ~urve is only an 8% amplitude of fluctuation
as compared with an 18% fluctuation of the solid curve (see

Figure

J).

This is due to the fact that in the period of 1963-

1968, the government acquisitions of grain from the market
accounted for a much higher percentage of output than in the
period ~f 1969-197~.

11

The above analysis shows that the seasonal operation is
complementary to the cyclical operation in a technical sense
(i.e., to preserve the quality of rice).

The main purpose of

aeasonal operation is really on the equity ground.

we shall

In what follows

show that the seasonal operation is in fact an easy by

product of the anti-cyclical operation.

10

Section II. Anti-Cyclical Operation
For the analysis of crop failure induced fluctuation, a
basic assumption is that the long-run supply of rice output is

adequate to feed an expanding population which occurred throughout
the Ch'ing period.

The fluctuations of rice crop throughout time

is indicated by the crop fluctuation curve (i.e., curve I) in
Figure 4 around a long-run trend curve (curve II) which reflects
the demand for the rice with population expansion.
means that the sum of areas (B

1

+ B

2

The assumption

+ BJ ••• ) representing the

rice surplus in bumper crop years is approximately the same as
the sum of areas (D

1

+

D
2

+

DJ ••• ) representing the total rice

deficiency in lean crop years.

The civilization obviously cannot

survive unless this assumption (l:B.

l.

= l: D.) is fulfilled in a
1

closed agrarianism (i.e., a society without foreign trade).
Much of the principles discussed above with respect to

'

se~so~al fluctuation are applicable to crop failure induced

fluctuation.

Thus the function of public granary is to store up

B.1 to be released for consumption in order to make up for the
~eficiency of Di and hence increases the time utility of rice
crops.

In this anti-cyclical operation, the government, to a

certain extent, will have to deal with deficiency of the private
storage system controlled by the speculated market.

It is, however,

important to recognize the di~ference between cyclical and seasonal
~luctuations as they are crucially related to the evolution of
public granary system during the Ch'ing dynasty.
J..s c'ompare with seasonal fluctuation,

the cyclical fluctuation

11

is characterized by three conspicuous characteristics: (i) uneven
periodicity, (ii) uneven amplitude of fluctuation, and (iii) more
severe amplitude of fluctuation.

dimension.

There is, moreover, a spatial

A severe deficit (e.g., D and 0 ) described by
8
4

historians as "consecutive severe droughts" (lien-nien-ta-han)
implies severe crop failures for several consecutive years
spreading over a wide geographic regions.

On the contrary, a

superb abundant bumper crops (e.g. B and B ) recorded as
2
5
"consecutive bumper crops" (li en-sui -t a-shou) implies the opposite.
The local gazetteers are full of such anecdotal descriptions.
The irregular periodicity and amplitude of cyclical fluctua
tions renders the predictions of future crops more difficult.
For this reason, the role of anti-cyclical fluctuation as executed
in the private market becomes more speculative.

Moreover, the

severity of amplitu3e of cyclical fluctuations implies that the
stora~e capacity needed to address to this type of fluctuation is

usually beyond the capacity of private granary.

For all these

reasons, while the major role for the management of the time
utility of rice in respect to seasonal fluctuation is played by
the merchants with the government playing only a •ubordinating
role, the opposite is true for ant.i-cyclical fluctuations.

For

in the latter case, the government has to play the primary role
while the merchants the subordinating one.

The basic principle governing the anti-cyclical operation
centers in the quantity of rice in storage (QRIS).
is not a major consideration for seasonal operation.

The quantity
In Figure

1 1 for example, the government seasonal operation as a fraction

12
of the total seasonal operation is measured by the ratio ax/ac
(i.e., the government autumn buying as a fraction of the total
output).

The magnitude of this ratiq is unimportant.

Provided

the government maintains an anti-cyclical stock (i.e., cs in
Figure 1), a mere announcement of the government intention to
stabilize seasonal price fluctuations is sufficient to forestall
private speculations.

The rational seasonal fluctuation pattern

can be restored without actual buying and selling.

12

It is thu~

seen when the anti-cyclical stock is adequate, the anti-seasonal
operation can come easily as a by-product.
The situation is entirely different for anti-cyclical
fluctuation.
importance.

Here the quantity (i.e, QRIS) is of crucial
A large quantity can defend against a more severe

fluctuation while a small quantity cannot do.

With a constant

mag~itude of QRIS (i.e., constant storage capacity), the anti-

' fluctuation capacity is shown by the pair of dotted
cyclical
curves III and IV in Figure

4.

This capacity is adequate only to

take care of less severe fluctuations (e.g., D , B , DJ'
1
1
fall within the range.

a4 )

which

For more severe fluctuations (e.g., B ,
2

BJ' D~) that fall out of this range, the storage capacity
becomes powerless.
When severe fluctuations beyond the storage capacity occur,

the "adjustment mechanism" becomes painful during the bumper crop
years.

Rice price could drop to the bottom that is harmful to

the farmers (ku-chien-shang-nung).

13

During a severe deficit

year, the "adjustment mechanism" takes on two forms.

On the one

hand, there is regional adjustment through the shipment from

lJ
the public storage of bumper crop regions to the deficit neighbors.
On the other hand, the adjustment may take on the most painful
way of migration of refugees or even.starvation.

The only way

to defend against a more severe fluctuation is to increase the
storage capacity leading to a shift of the curves from III and
IV to V and VI in Figure

4.

Section III. Construction and Decline of Public Granary Institution
From the above analysis, we see that the major principle
governing rational design of public granary system is that the
quantity (QRIS} is directed mainly at anti-cyclical fluctuations
with anti-seasonal fluctuations come easily as a by-product.
Furthermore, for anti-cyclical fluctuations, the basic principle
is to expand the storage capacity through time so that the system
can defend against i.ncreasingly more severe crop fluctuations.
I•eally, a rational institutional design of public granary
is to increase the warehouse capacity and to build up an ever
increasing stock of grain (QRIS). This is shown by the increasing
the lower deck of
curve AT inAFigure 4 such that the shaded triangles (d ,d , ct ••• )
1 2
3
represent the amount of increase ot QRIS, that the government

acquires from the market.

The construction and decline of public

granary system can be seen essentially from the long-run trend

of the QRIS.

During the prosperous period, we expect QRIS to

increase (i.e., from point A to-point T).

During the declining

phase, we expect QRIS to exhibit a long-run decreasing trend as
shown by the curve TB, implying a successive decrease of QRIS
(e , e

1

2

, e ••• ).

3

Such decreases are probably a result of the

financial difficulties of local governments making it more difficult

to budget expenditure to acquire additional rice stock as they did
in the prosperous phase.

There is a unanimous agreement among

historians that the financial position of the Ch'ing government

.

was much better during the prosperous than in the later period.

14

The construction and decline of public granary system is
manifested mainly in the severity of the cyclical pattern of
price fluctuations which the system seeks to eliminate.

During

the prosperous phase, we expect the degree of price fluctuaLions
During the declining

becomes increasingly less severe through time.

phase, we expect price fluctuations become increasingly more severe

through time until the QRIS is exhausted and henceforth, the
price fluctuations become the most severe.
On a closer examination, we should look at the rules according
to which the incremental QRIS (d , d , d ••• ) are acquired .during
2
1
3
the pr'bsperous phase.

Because of the fact that the anti-cyclical

measures already in operation, the incremental acquisitions (d.)
1
are acquired mainly during the bumper crop years (B , B , B ••• ).
2
1
3

Possibly, during the deficit crop years (D , D , 0 ••• ), the
2
1
3
public granary does not release as much grain as it would have
been, had there been adequate storage from the very beginning.

During the declining phase, the government does not acquire as

much grain during the bumper crop years (B , B , B ••• ) and may

6

7

8

release more grain during the deficit years (D , 0 ••• ) as the

7

8

public granary is gradually exhausted.
The implication of the above rules ot acquisition on price
~luctuations is shown in curves VIII and IX in Figure

4.

The

15
solid curve VIII which represents the cyclical price fluctuations
with the same periodicity as the crop fluctuation curve and with

an amplitude of fluctuation in proportion with {but in the
opposite direction) the crop fluctuation curve.

The rules of

acquisition is shown by the dotted curve IX whereby during the
prosperous phase, in both bumper years and deficit years the
prices are elevated.

During the declining phase, the opposite

is true; in both bumper years and deficit years, the market

.
are d epressed. 15
prices
Section VI. Statistical Data
For statistical implementation, we need data on the time
path of QRIS as well as data on the time pattern of prices.

In

our study, we use data collected from various local gazetteers
of Szechwan provin:e including counties and prefectures as shown
in APJ>endix I.

16

The study of Szechwan alone is meant to be an

illustration for the evolution of granary system for the country
as a whole for which data will be gradually organized.

Although we believe that we have collected all the r-elevant
data from the local gazetteers of Szechwan for the entire period,

the spottiness of historical data makes it necessary for us to
make certain assumptions in respect to their interpretation.

These assumptions as well as the data source and the computation
procedures are given in details in appendix.

The summary of

these data are presented as time series in a diagrammtic form in
the text to facilitate our discussion.

16
Section V. Empirical Verification
In order to verify the thesis for the construction and
decline of granary ~nstitution, the ·statistical data on the evernormal granary is used here as a major reference.

With the

vertical axis indicated on the right the total public granary
stock (TPGS) is indicated by a solid curve in Figure

s. 17

It

is seen that TPGS increases consistently and monotonously from a
negligible magnitude from 1680 to a peak value around 1812,
thereafter it declines consistently.

This pattern demonstrates

conclusively that we can divide the Ch'ing dynasty into two
periods: a stock increasing phase (SIP, 1680-1815) which approximately
coincides with the prosperous phase and a stock decreasing phase
(SDP 1 1815-1911) coinciding the declining phase.
The stock decreasing phase is again subdivided into two
ph4ses: a stock reducing phase (SRP 1 1815-1850) and a stock
exhausting phase (SEP, 1850 onward).

The demaraction of these

phases partially reflects the historical event of the Taiping
Rebellion which urshered in a phase of severe fiscal difficulties
so that the government expenditures were shifted drastically to
other more urgent needs.

This is reflected in curve I in Figure

5 by the drastic decline of the total stock of grain between 1850
and 1860.

18

The time pattern for the whole province that we have seen
can be verified by patterns of individual administrative districts
in Sz~chwan.

In Figure

6, the time pattern of the QRIS for ten

individual' counties are depicted.

A visual impression con~inces

17
us that they demonstrat e the same pattern as the curve for the

Thus in the stock increasing phase, all local

whole province.

government s seem to have make an uniform effort in the granary

constructio n process while all of them fell the pressure and
contribute to the decline of the granary institution during the
declining phase.
In Figure
are shown.

7,

the time path of rice prices for these periods

Notice that these prices are plotted on a logarithmi c

scale on the vertical axis.

This means that throughout these

periods, the fluctuation s of rice price are much more violent
than what a visual impression would have conveyed.

Also

notice

that the very nature of the local gazetteers tended to record not
the regular market price as a modern price index will require.
Instead, they tended to record major events (e.g., prices at
times of major cala~ities or major bumper crop years) with
cer.tat:n "journalis tic" values.
Thus, the time path of Figure 7 really shows the extreme.
variation of rice prices.

The amplitude of fluctuation is indeed

very violent accor~ing to a modern standard.

For example, in

terms of copper cash, the prices varied from a low value of ~00
cash to a high value of 5 1 000

1860-1870.
times!

~

in the ten-year period of

This means that the prices can ·vary more than 10

Most modern countries will regard this as extremely

unlikely and intolerabl e.

The violent price fluctuation for the

historical period can be more clearly seen with the contempora ry
For example, in Taiwan during the past
experience .
much longer period,

25 years-(i.e ., a

A19s3-1917 >, the fluctuation of rice prices between a high price

18
in 1975 (11.01 NT Yuan per kg.) and a low price in 1954 (1.89 NT
Yuan per kg.) was only 5.8 times.

19

In our analysis, the violence of price fluctuation for the
Ch'ing period should be examined from the viewpoint of adequacy
of the size of QRIS.

The data for the year 1812 (i.e., the date

when the maximum value was achieved in curve I of Figure
very complete.

5) is

In that year, the total amount of rice stockpiled

in the ever-normal granaries in Szechwan was J,118,004 shih and
Altogether,

that in the community granaries was 1,56J,006 shih.
there were 4,681,010

~

of rice stock piled in Szechwan, while

the total number of household(~) was 5,050,48~.

The average

amounts to .9268 shih per household (see Table 1 in Appendix I).
Since there were, on the average, 4.8 adults per household, the
per adult person grain storage was only .1931 shih, or about 25
catties (assuming; shih = 130 catties).

Assuming that annual

consu~ption of grain per person was 400 catties, the storage of
rice in Szechwan at times of maxi•um was no more than 6.25% of
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.
th e annua1 consumption.

Thus, even in the peak year of 1812,

the public granary which was the main instrument for defending
against cyclical fluctuations was apparently inadequate.
Again, using contemporay standard as a guide to measure
the historical experience, we know that the rice stored in public
warehouse in Taiwan for the last twenty years could usually take

care of consumption for two months.
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In comparison with the case

of Szechwan in the Ch'ing dynasty, even at the peak storage
capacity in 1812, the storage capacity would only take care of the
consumption of adult population for 2J days, ~nd~t course, even fewer
days, if the demand of non-adult population is added.

In other words,
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the modern capacity to defend against cyclical fluctuation is at
least
period.

three times that of the maximum capacityac hieved in the Ch'ing
It is no wonder that the historical grain storage capacity

did not has the power to elimate the very violent price fluctuation s.

As far as the severity of price fluctuation is concerned, we
naturally expect that prices fluctuate most severely during the
stock exhausting phase after 1850.

For the two earlier periods,

we expect the prices flutuate slightly less during the stock
reducing phase than during the stock increasing phase.

This is

due to the fact that in the latter phase, rice must be acquired
from the market by the government on a net basis, while during
the former phase, rice is gradually released.

For the three

periods, the coefficien t of variation (i.e., standard deviation/
mean) are respective ly

.

prediction s.

.4J, .40, and .64 which support our

(see ~able Jin Appendix I) •

'A gain,
.
.
.
i f we
using
contempora ry standard as a yardstick,

compute the coefficien t of variation of the rice prices in Taiwan
during 1953-1973, before the price rose very drasticall y in 1974,
the value is .JO, which is lower than our ovservatio ns in
Szechwan during the Ch'ing period.

However, taking the whole

period of 1953-1977 into considerat ion, the value is

.54.

This

comparison suggests that the pric6s recorded in the lo9al
gazetteers are not at all unbelievab le.
Taking into considerat ion ot the rules ot anti-cycli cal
operation discussed in the earlier section, we expect that during
the stock increasing phase (1750-1815 ), the government defends
more vigerously against price_ decline during the bumper crop
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years and defends the price increases during the lean crop years
less vigerously.
phase.

The opposite is true during the stock decreasing

This idea is shown by the long run price trend ABCD in

Figure 7 such that the shaded areas below the price trend are
smaller than those ahove the price trend during the stock

increasing phase.

The opposite is true during the stock

.
l
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d ecreas1.ng p1ase.

Conclusion
We have shown that the construction and decline of the public
granary system coincides with that of the prosperous and declining
phases of the Ch' ing dynasty.

This institutional evolution is

reflected in turn by the effectiveness on the elimination of

price fluctuations which the public granary institution aims to
prevent.
~he founder of the Ch'ing dynasty did have the vision to
strengthen the economy's capacity to achieve social security by
increasing the grain in storage through time.

However, after 150

years (1660-1810) of consistent efforts, they have not been able
to build up a sizable public granary stock to eliminate severe
price fluctuations.

In the absence of wars and other exogenous

historical events in the nineteenth century, the size of public

granary stock would have kept on increasing.

There are records

in earlier periods when the public granary had accumulated a
very sizable stock. 23
The fate of the Ch'ing dynasty can probably be assessed with
this historical hindsight on public granary capacity.
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Appen dix I.

Data Sourc e

1. Data of Quan tity of Rice in Stora ge
The quan tities of rice in stora ge in the ch'an
g-p'i ng-ts 'ang
and she-t s'ang for the year 1812 are liste
d in Table 1 showi ng

the total amoun t of the whole provi nce and the
subto tal of each
prefe cture {.!2:,) and indep enden t depar tment {chih
-li-ch ou).

Each

of these admi nistr ative units conta ins a numb
er of coun ties

(hsie n) for which the origi nal stati stics are avail
able.

The

stati stics shown in Table 1 are the aggre gates
of the coun ties.
Also liste d in Table 1 are the numb er of house
holds in each
admi nistr ative unit.

More over, the avera ge numb er of rice in

stora ge per count y and per house hold are comp uted
and liste d in
Table 1.

It shoul d be noted that the figur es of the popu
lation

as ~ecor ded with those of house hold in the Szech
wan t'ung -chih

'

(1816 ~d.), are proba bly relat ed to adult s only,
for state ment
given in this local gaze tteer reads :

11 • • •

there a r e ~ (male s)

of how many ting {adu lt) and fu (adul t fema les)
of how man y~
(mou th)."

With this assum ption , the avera ge numb er of adult
s

per house hold is comp uted as menti oned in the
text.

Table 1. Quantity of Rice in Storage in Szechwan, 1812

C'J
C\I

unit: shih
Place

ts' ang
Szechwan
Ch'eng-tu
Ch'ung-ch' ing
Pao-ning
Shung-ch'in g
Hsu-chou
K'ui-chou
Lung-an
Ning-yuan
Ya-chou
Chia-ting
T'ung-ch'u an
Sui-ting
Mei-chou
Ch' i ung-chou
Lu-chou
Tzu-chou
Mien-chou
Chung-chou
Yu-yang
Mao-chou
Hsu-yung
T'ai-p'ing -t'ing

•

Total

Ch' ang-p 'ing

J, 118 ,oo4
657,99)
452,498
87,057
130,905
2JO,J78
1J2,570
40,158+
10J,J40+
61,176 +
296,944
126,600
54,710
108,JlO
41,000
16J,OOO
186,070
72,480
78,480
45,548
10,837+
33,750
4,200

She-ts'ang

1,56J,006
456,686
124,957
4,746
JJ,676
79,5J4
16,069
28,558
27,654
42,810
155,102
50,861
J9.84o
JJ,9JJ
108,670
37,761
108,747
166,467
9,224
14,44J
1,654:
14,805
5,112

The number of bsien is in parenthesi s.

+ Part of these amounts are not rice,

regulated by the Board of Revenue.

1865), 17:20.

Average

Quantity

4,681,010
1,114,679
577,455
91,803
164,581
J09,912
148,639
68.716
1J0,994
103,986
452,046
177,461
94.550
142,243
149,670
200,761
249,817
2)8,947
87,704
59,991
12,491
48,555
9,312

per hsien •

JJ,920
69,667
41,246
10,200
20,572
2J ,839
24,773
17,179
26,199
14,855
56,505
22,183
18,910
35,560
49,890
50,190
68,96J
39,824
21,926
14,997
6,245
24,277
9,312

(138)

(
{
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(
(

16)
14)
9)
8)
13)
6)
4)
S)
7)
8)
8)
5)
4)
J)

4)
S)
6)
4)

4)
2)
2)

1)

No. of
Household

5,050,482
1,167,J4J
690, t6J
212,037
24J,878
390,021
t86,J04
91,757
145,497
116, 724JO? ,527
J11,J70
185,4-o4106,so488,209
148,470
141,257
156,707
lJ0,661
117,54-4
9,565
52,176
26,)64

Average
per Household

.9268
.9549
.8367
• 4JJO
.6748
-7946
.7978
.7489
.900)
.8909
1.494-2
.5699
.5099
1.JJS6
1.6968
1.3522
2.0871
1.524-8
.6712
.5104.)157
.9306
.J5J2

,.

but they are converted to rice according to the rates
See Hu-pu tse-fi (regulation s of the Board of Revenue,

Source: The quantity of storage in ch'ang-p'in g-ts'ang, see Hu-pu tse-li, 18:24-25;
The quantity of storage in ch'ang-p'in g-ts'ang and she-ts•ang can also be found in
Szechwan t 1 un9-£h.ih. (The gazetteer of Szechwan province, 1816), 72:11-19.
We have
c~mpared the records in most local gazetteers of individual county and found that
95 hsien had the same figure as mentioned in the two sources indicated above. The
number of houaeholda see Szechwan t•ung-chih , 65:1•J7.

_

23
2. Data of Changes of Rice in Storage
From all the local gazetteers in Szechwan, we have selected

34 counties for which data aoubt the changes of rice stockpiled in
the ch'ang-p'ing-ts'ang through time are available.

The annual

growth rate is first computed with the exponential formular for

each individual county at. the time points when data are available.
Then, the average of the growth rate at each time point is computed.
The results of these computations are shown in Table 2.

Also

shown in Table 2 are the estimated total quantity of rice in storage
at each time point.

These numbers are obtained by using the actual

total amount of rice in storage in 1812 (shown in Table 1) as a
reference and extrapolating with the growth rate at each time point
forward and backward.

These estimated amounts do not mean to

represent the real magnitudes but rather to show a trend of change.

In addition to-the ch'an_g-p'ing-ts'ang, there were other
public granaries, such.as she-ts'ang, i-ts'ang and after 1880 1
chi-ku-ts'ang (literally, grain stockpiling granary), established
in rural area.

However, the statistics available for these lesser

establishments are all the more spotty.

It may not be worthwhile

to try to piece them together for an overall observation •

•In

addition to the local gazetteers of ten counties indicated in

Figure
~

6, other 24 counties are as follows: (.!:!£ denoted for hisen

or the gazetteer of county, CC for chou-chih or the gazetteer

of department, and FC for fu-chih or the gazetteer of prefecture).
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Chin- t'ang HC (1844), 8:10-12;

(1867), 8:1; (1921), 3:10-11.

Nan-ch'uan HC (1931), 4:16-18.
Pi-shan HC (1865), 2:34-43.
Ting-yuan HC (1843), 3:38;
Chao-hua HC (1821), 19:2;

(1875), 2:3-4.
(1864), 19:1-3.

Yun-yang !IC (1827), 11:2-3;
Wan HC ( 18 2 7 ) , 11 : 3 ;

(1854), J:2-J;

(1935), 19:1-4.

( 18 6 6 ) , 9 : 8- 9 •

Hui-li CC (1870), 9:1-2.
Chia-chiang HC {181J), 3:5-6;

Wei-yuan HC {1775), J:J6;

(1935), J: 11.

(1877), 2:5-6.

San-t'ai HC (1814), 2:56; T'ung-ch'uan FC (1786), 9:JJ-J4.
She-hung HC {1819), 6: 11;

(1884), 5:8-11; T 1 ung-ch'uan FC (1897),

11:8.

Chung-chiang HC (1899), J:7-10.
Sui-ning HC {1878),_ 1:86; T'ung-ch'uan FC (1786), 9:J5-J6 •

.

Mei. CC (1799), 6:19; Mei-shan HC (1923), 3:9-10.
Ch'ing-sheng HC (1877), 8:43-45.
Ch'iung CC (1818), 8:5-7.
Tzu-yang HC (1860), 6:10.
Jen-shou HC ( 1803) , 1:45-46; (1837), 2:21-2.)J ( 1866), ,3:J5-37Ching-yen HC (1900), 5:11-14.
Lo-chiang HC (1802), 1: 3;

(1865), 7:6-7.

An HC (1812:1864), 8:1-4.
Chung CC (1826), 4:17-19.
Hsiu-shan HC (1891), 4:5-6.
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Table 2.

The annual growth rate of rise in storage and
the estimated quantity in storage in Szechwan

annual growth rate

year

quantity in storage
unit: shih

.12
..!OJ6
.019
.051

1690
1700
1710
1720
17JO
. 1740
1750
1760
1770
1780
1790
1800
1810

.OBJ

.039
.017
· .019
.016
.014
• 0.)4
.032
.031

22,089
7J,JJ8
105,117
127,112
211,675
485,426
716,957
849,809
1,027,626
1,205,925
1,387,138
1,948,8J6
2,683,707
.3, 118,004

1815
-.018
-.OJO
-.042
-.05/s

2,849,649
2,111,091
1,387,103
808 ,Jis5

1860
1870
1880
1890

-.110
-.028
-.006
-.023

1900

-.011

269,083
203,370
191,527
152,175
136,324

1820
18~0
1840
1850

~
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J.

Data of the Prices of Rice
From about 60 local gazette ers of countie s and prefect ures

in Szechwa n, we have collect ed data ·of ~he prices of rice through out
the Ch'ing period.

It should be noted, however , these price

quotati ons are mostly related to bumrer crop years and deficit
crop years.

The extent to which these prices prevail ed cannot be

easily ascerta ined as there is, in most years, only one entry
availab le.

When there are more than one entry in one year, the

average value is taken.

Another problem is the measure ment unit.

The local gazette ers usually used the term "tou-mi " befoce a
quotati on of price.

The word tou should be underst ood as the

measure ment instrum ent of capacit y rather than as 0.1 ~ ,
otherwi se, the prices of rice in Szechwa n would be very high.
Table J shows these prices in the three periods with the average

.,

value{p ), the standar d deviati on(s), and the coeffic ient of
variatio n(V) compute d for each period.
The prices shown in Table J are quoted in terms of copper
cash.

In terms of silver, the prices in the third period (1850

onward) can be deflate d to some extent for we know that during
this period, the ratio of cash to
was usually more than 1200
. ... silver
.
cash to 1 tael.

From various local gazette ers, we have collect ed

spotty data related to the cash/si lver ratio through out the

Ch' ing period.

Suffice it here to mention particu larly that a

rather complet e series during the period 1830-19 24 can be found
in Chien-w ei HC (1937), 11:28-2 9.

Two other series of the period

1875-19 25 can be found in Ho-chia ng HC (1929), 2:27 and in Nan-hsi
!!£ (1937), 2:JJ.

27
Table

J.

Prices of Rice in Szechwa n

(1) Price Increas ing Phase, 1750-18 15

Year

Price in Cash
per shih

Source of Data

1751

525

1760

1,000

Lu-CC (1882), 12:67

1778

1,600

Yung-ch 'ang HC (188J), 19:1; She-hun g HC (1819),

Chao-hu a HC (1864), 19:1.

17:J; T'ung-c h'uan FC (1786), 11:51; Chiang

an HC (1812), 6:71.
1,500

1779

Hsu-cho u FC (1895), 2J:10; Hung-ya HC (1813),

16:2; Chung CC (1826), 4:44.
1783

JOO

1786

1,450

1788

400

Ya-an HC (1928), chuan 10.

1799

1,000

Hsu-cho u FC (1895), 23:11.

1800

1,000

!:.!:!, .££ (1882),

·1801

900

Ching-y en HC (1900), 42:8.
Tien-ch iang HC (1828), 6:J7.

12:67.

Chiang- an HC (1812), 6:71; Tien-ch iang HC

(1828), 6:J7.
180~ ":

1,000

Chung-c hiang HC (1839), 7:16.

1805

1,000

Jen-sho u HC (18J7), 5:JO.

1810

300

1812

1,500

Chung CC (1826), 4:44.

1814

1,000

Feng-ch ieh HC (1893), 11:1.

p

= 965
= 41.8
• 43
=

8

V

Ho-chia ng HC (1813), 52:18.

Table 3 (continued)

(2) Price Decreasing Phase, 1815-1850
Price in Cash

Year

Source of Data

per shih

1819

500

She-hung HC (1819), 6:11.

1823

350

Lu CC (1882), 12:65.

1824

1,000

Hsu-chou FC (1895), 23:11.

1825

1,000

T'ung-chuan FC (1897), 11:9.

1832

1,,000

Hsu-chou FC (1895), 23:11.

1838

1,000

Chung-chiang HC (1839), 7:19; Jen-shou HC

(1866), 9:J4.
1840

1,100

1843

800

Ch'ung-ch'ing FC (184J), 3:4J.

1844

650

Ch' eng-k •out' ing-chih ( 1844), 6: 14.

t845

320

Lu CC (1882), 12:65; Ho CC (1876), 2:6.

1849

1,500

p
s

=
=

V =

.,

838
JJ.8
.40

Ho CC (1876), 2:6.

Hsiu-shan HC (1891), J:13 •.
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Table 3 (continued)
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(J) Price Increasing Phase, 1850-1890
Year

Price in Cash
per shih

1855

1,100

Hsu-chou FC (1895), 23:12.

1860

1,200

P'eng He (1878), 4:41.

1861

400

1863

4,ooo

Feng-hsi HC (1899),_ 4:22.

1864

2,000

Lu CC (1882), 12:66; She-hung HC (1819), 17:J;

Source of Data

Ho-chiang HC (1871), 52:18.

Tzu CC (1876), J0:5; Ho-chiang HC (1871),

1865

1,500

52:18.
Tzu CC (1876), J0:8.

1866

1,000

Tan-ling HC (1892), 10:29.

1869

5,000

Hsiu-shan HC (1891), J:24.

1871
1872

1,850

Ho CC (1876), 2:6; Lo-chih HC (1883), J:1.

2 ,JOO

Lo-chih HC (1883), J:1;

1875

J,100

Nan-hsi HC (19.37), 2:J6.

1879
1880

500
J,200

ya-~n HC (1928), Chuan 10.

1881

500
4,ooo

°'

188.3
1884

Nan-hsi HC (19.37), 2:J6;
P'ei CC (1928), 24:6.
Hsiu-shan HC (1891), J:25.
She-hung HC (1884), 5:8.

1885

750
4,ooo

Nan-hsi HC (19.37), 2:J6 •.

1886

2,000

P'ei CC (1928), 24:6; Nan-hsi HC (19.37), 6:J;
Tan-ling HC (1892), 10:29.

2,000

1890

Yung HC (1929), 7:16; Kuang-an CC (1907),

1J:6; Nan-hsi HC (19.37), 2:J6.
p == 2,126
=

135~3

V =

.64

5
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Appendix II

In this appendix, we want to prove that the real interest
rate in terms of rice (r) is twice that of the market interest

Let x be the amount of rice that the farmers borrow in

rate (i).

March and p

•

the price of rice.

Then, in terms of money, the

amount to be paid back in August at the market interest rate (i) is

•

p xe

i6

,

If, in August, the farmers sell y units of rice at price

p• to pay back what they borrowed last March, we have
1)

• i6
P.Y = p xe

However, in terms of rice, the same process of borrowing and
returning can be stated as
. 2)

xe

r6

= y.

From equations (1) and (2), we know
Ja)
b')

e

r6

•

= (p /p.) e

i6

or

r = (1/6)lri(p*/p.) + i

Thus, the rice rate of interest (r) is the sumo! the market rate
of interest

•

(i) and a term which increases with p /p ••

•

In order to determine p /p., the storage cost to the grain
merchants is again computed as the market rate of interest.

If

the merchants incur monthly storage charge, the cost per month
may be written as (i + j).

Thus, the ceiling and bottom prices

are determined by
4a)
b)

p

•

= p.e

+ j) 6 , implying

•

(1/6)ln(p /p.) = i + j.

Substituting in
5)

(i

Jb), we have

r -= 2i + j.
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Thus, the rice rate of interest is at least 2i even when there is
completely no storage cost which is our as~umption in the text.
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Notes

1

For a discussion of periodization of Chinese history, see

Lien-sheng Yang, "Toward a Study of Dynastic Configurations in
Chinese History," in Studies in Chinese Institutional History
(Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 1-17.
2

See, Yao Shan-yu, "The Chronological and Seasonal Distribution

of Floods and Droughts in Chinese History, 206 B.C.-A.D. 1911,"
Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 6(1942), 273-312; "The
Geographical Distribution of Floods and Droughts in Chinese
History, 206 B.C.-A.D. 1911," Far Eastern Quartery 2.1:t (1943),
357-.378; "Flood and Drought Data in the T'u-shu chi-ch'eng and
the Ch'ing shih-kao,

11

Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 8 (191:Lt),

214-226.

3 rn addition t~ the ch'ang-p'ing-ts'ang of the Han dynasty,
the i-ts'ang (charity granary) was added in the Sui dynasty; the
~aE1!._-hui-t s 'ang (extensive benevolent granary·) was added in ·Sung
Dynasty; the yu-pei=._ts'ang (preparatory granary) and the shets'ang (community granary) were added in the Ming dynasty.

See

Han-shu (The History of Han Dynasty), 24A:19; Sui-shu (The History
of Sui Dynasty), 24:15; Sung-shih (The History of Sung Dynasty),

176:14-17; ~n~shih (The History of Ming Dynasty), 79:11-1,3.
The edition of these dynastic histories is the reprint edition by

I-wen Bookstore, Taipei.
4

.See, for example, Szechwan t'ung-chih (1816 ed.) 72:6-11

for the establishment and regulation of granary in Szechwan.

a discussion of granary as a famin~ contra! institution duning

For
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the ch'ing dynasty, see Kung-chuan Hsiao, Rural-China: Imperial
Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle, 1960), ch. 5.
5 The major social security iss~e in the U.S. centered in
child and senior citizen welfare and unemployment,

relative to

which the institutions of "social security" and "unemployment
compensation'' are designed.

The first issue is obviously traced

to the longivity of human life and the non-coincidence of the
productive period (e.g., ages 20-68) and the periods when an
individual becomes a "dependent population" (i.e., below age 20
and above age

68).

Unemployment, according to modern theory, is

caused by the instability of investment which is the currently
produced capital goods that leads to the expansion of the capacity
of consumer goods output in the iuture, again a divergence b~tween

current production and future consumption.
~Notice that i~ Taiwan, the p• prevails in the month of
September while the p • in the month of Feburary.
will have shifted earlier for a lunar calendar.

These months
In the sub-

tropical climate of Taiwan, there are two crops of rice which ripe
in July and October respectively.

For these reasons, the selection

of August and March in our diagram is mainly a theoretical simplific

ation.

For an analysis of the months in which the peak and bottom
I

•

prices prevailed during the Ch'ing period, see Chuan Han-sheng,
11

Ch'ing Yung-cheng nine-chien ti ·mi-chia (Rice prices during the

Yung-cheng reign

(172J-17J5), 11 in Chung-kuo ching-chi-shih lun-

ts•ung (Studies on Chinese Economic History; Hong Kong, 1972),
PP•

5J4-5J5.

34
7 For a brief discussion of this meanure
see, Lien-sheng
Yang, Money and Credit in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp.

96-97-

For Wang An-shih's reform s~e James T. C. Liu, Reform in

Sung China (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).
8

under the ch'ing-miao regulation, the interest charged for

the most part of China was 20 per cent and for Ho-pei area
per cent.

JO

This meant that if the period of loan was six months,

the compound interest rate per month was .04 for Ho-pei and
the rest of China.

.OJ for

Then, the completely equitable rice interest

rate to the farmers were .08 and .06 respectively.

Taking the

rate of .08 as an example, if the farmers harrowed 1 bushel of
rice in March,
in August.

they were expected to pay (1.08) 6 = 1.58 bushel

Although there were loud prote.!!lt against Wang An-shlh

on account of this alarming high rate of interest, the protest

was,

in fact, groundless as this rice rate of interest was

~

completely unavoidable in view of the capital shortage and high
commercial interest rate ( e.g., 20% for six months loan).

9szechwan t'ung-chih (1816), 72:6.
10

In our interview with officials of Taiwan Provincial Food

Bureau, we are told that even with the modern scientific princibles

of ventilation and dehumidificat ion, the rice in storage must be
rotated every two years.

In a less humid climate area than

Taiwan, a rotation based on three-year cycle is very reasonable.

Cf. Hu-pu tse-li, 16:12-13, for the regulation of rotation cycle
in various provinces.
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. o f government storage o f rice
.
.
Taiwan
.
or an ana 1 ys1s
in

see Huang Teng-chung, "Taiwan ku-chia ch'ang-ch'i pien-tung chih
feng-hsi yen-chiu (An analsysis of secular trend of rice price in

Taiwan)," Paper present at the meeting of Association of
Agricultural Economics (Taipei, January 1978), pp. 16-20.

12 Th.

.
.
is is
comparab 1 e to the stabi. 1.1ty of foreign
exc h ange

rate ensured by the very announcement of the central bank that

stands ready to buy and sell at a constant rate.

This announcement

has the effect of forestalling speculation provided the central
bank has adequate reserve of foreign exchange stock, comparable

to our anti-cyclical rice stock.

The rotation of rice through

seasonal operation mentioned earlier is for the purpose of preserving
the quality of rice in storage and has little to do with anti
cyclical price fluctuations.
1
-(This phenomenon was recognized by Chinese people as early

as in the period of Warring States, see Nancy Lee Swann, Food and
Money in Ancient China (Princeton, 1950), p. 139.

14 See, for example, Ts'ui-jung Liu and John C. H. Fei,
"An Analysis of the Land Tax Burden in China, 1650-1865, 11 Journal

of Economic History, 37.2 (June 1977), 378.

15 The observation here has statistical significance when
empirical data are used to implement the theory.

This is due to

the fact that the observable data on rice prices ·are mainly
indicated by the dotted curve, while the solid curve cannot be
observed, i.e., it exists only ideally.
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Szechwan is selected as our case of study under two

considerations:

(i) this province was a major rice production area

and (ii) of all local gazetteers throughout China that we have
investigated, the local gazetteers of Szechwan contained the most
complete data on the subject of granary system.

17 As explained in appendix, curve I in Figure 5 is built up
from curve II which is, in turn, obtained as an average value for
all the districts from which data are available.
the growth rate of grain in storage.

Curve II shows

Note that in the SIP, the

growth rate has a decreasing trend while in the SDP, the growth
rate curve is u-shaped.

This kind of pattern is entirely to be

expected as the growth rate should show a declining trend because
the stock value increases.

Similarily, the u-shaped pattern in

the SDP is to be expected.

Hence, the time pattern of stock of

.,

grain
' a s illustrated in curve I portrays a reasonable picture for

Szechwan province.
18

Many local gazetteers reported difficulties in refurnishing

the granary stock on account of military need and government
financial difficulties during 1850-1860.

See, for example, Hsu-hsiu

Hsin-fan hsien-chih (1873 ed.), 4:16; Chien-chou hsu-chih (1897 ed),

A:80J Chiang-chin hsien-chih (1875 ed.), 4:9-10.
19 Huang Teng-chung, "Taiwan ku-chia," Table 1 (J) tor annual
average price of rice in Taiwan.

20

see Dwight Perkins, Agricultural Development in China,

1368-1968

(Chicago, 1969), pp. 14-15 for the argument of the

minimum level of graiH consumption.
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The annual time trend of storage capacity in Taiwan is a

state secret.

We are informed by the officials of the Taiwan

Provincial Food Bureau that the storage capacity can take care
for the consumption for two months.

This two-month capacity is

also a target in Japan.

22

Thus ideallyt our thesis can be verified or refuted if the

long-run price trend data is available.

Unfortunately, we do not

have the price index of Szechwan during the entire period.
}!;;. ... •·.:.heng

Chuan

has constructed some price index series averaging out

seasonal fluctuation for the lower Yangtze area in the eighteenth
century and for Szechwan in the late nineteenth century, see
Chung-kuo ching-chi-shih lun-ts'ung, pp.

475-566; 767~776.

.,

Th~ long-run price trends are determined by monetary factors
associated with international trade and silver import and export.
lne curve ABCD in

Figure 6 reflects only the pattern ot lorig-run

price trend for the country as a whole as compiled by Yeh-chien
Wang, see "The Secular Trend of Prices during the Ch'ing Period,"

Journal of the Institute of Chinese Studies of the Chinese University
of Hong Kong, 5.2 (1972), J62.

That trend price declines during

the SRP and increases during the other two phases is a mere
historical coincidence from the viewpoint of our analysis.

23 For example, at the reign of the
Wen Emperor of Sui (581-

604), the total quantity of grain in stock was eo large as it was
said that it could provide for the need of fifty years.

See Ch'ien

J8
Mu, Kuo-shih-ta-kang (An outline of Chinese history; first ed.,

1940, Taipei ed., 1966), P• 274.

For such a l1uge stock, it is

mathematically impossible to rotate the grain over a three-year
cycle.

This technical difficulty alone is sufficient to induce the

government to use the grain before the quality deteriorates.

This is

perhaps a major reason that led to the various social overhead
construction projects (digging canal, constructing palace etc.)
legendarily launched by Emperor Yang of the Sui dynasty.

QRIS = ax+.,.y+yc
output

quantity of rice in storage
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